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Abstract* 
 
This paper analyzes the evolution and current profile of teacher unionization and 
estimate the impact of unionization on the quality of public education in Peru.  
The research uses data from a 1999 household survey (ENAHO) and from a 
recent evaluation of a public program oriented to improve the quality of Peruvian 
public education.   
 
Regarding the evolution of unionization, there is evidence compatible with 
the hypothesis that the rate of teacher unionization has dropped during the last 
three decades, but especially during the 1990s, due basically to the hiring of 
temporary teachers.   
 
With respect to the profile of unionization, it is found that unionized 
teachers are older and more experienced, and that males are more common in the 
union membership.  There is no empirical evidence that unionized teachers enjoy 
better access to educational infrastructure at the polidocente (larger) schools, but 
they do have better access at the multigrado (intermediate) schools.   
 
For the impact of unionization on quality, Hoxby’s production function model 
was adapted to the Peruvian case, in which public education is centralized and in 
which teachers do not have major influence on the education budget at the school 
or district levels.  The model is estimated to test whether unionization has an 
impact on teachers’ effort and student achievement, but there is no empirical 
support for these hypotheses.  The data indicate that unionization does not 
currently seem to be a major factor affecting the quality of educational services in 
the Peruvian public education system.  
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Introduction 
 
Peruvian public education is characterized by high coverage (at developed country levels) but 
extremely low expenditures per student, which raises serious concerns regarding the quality of 
the educational services that Peruvian children are receiving.  Recent efforts by the Government 
of Peru to face this problem have been oriented toward increasing public expenditures on 
education infrastructure, inputs and teacher training, especially through a program focused on 
increasing the quality of education called MECEP (Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educacion 
Peruana).  The program has increased inputs and training to teachers, although without 
significant changes in the institutional context in which the educational system works.  There are 
concerns that the effectiveness of this policy may be limited due to adverse institutional factors. 
One such important institutional factor is the presence of an important teachers’ union 
(known by its Spanish acronym SUTEP) in the Peruvian educational public sector.  The union 
might play a role in the provision of educational services if it affects the allocation of public 
resources to education and/or the incentives their affiliates face to provide services.  This study is 
oriented toward evaluating empirically whether teacher unionism plays such a role in the 
Peruvian context.   
There are no prior studies in Peru about the role of the teachers’ union in the provision of 
education from an institutional and economic perspective.  SUTEP is the only teachers’ union in 
Peru and its current membership is estimated at 145,000 teachers nationwide.  Founded in the 
1970s, SUTEP has had an important role in the last three decades due to the mobilization of 
teachers, especially during the 1970s and 1980s.  Its political clout and economic importance 
declined during the 1990s, although recently (2000-2001) it has started to increase its influence 
on policy in response to the Ministry of Education’s controversial practice of appointing 
temporary teachers.  As the union is still one of the largest in Peru’s public sector, questions 
regarding its effect on the quantity and quality of educational services clearly remain important 
for policymakers and researchers.   
In particular, this project addresses four specific questions related to the teachers’ union: 
(i) how has the rate of teacher unionization evolved during the last three decades?; (ii) is the 
profile of unionized teachers different from that of non-unionized ones?; (iii) is there empirical 
evidence that teachers affiliated with SUTEP have better access to educational resources than 
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non-unionized teachers?; and (iv) is there empirical evidence that unionized teachers display 
different (better or worse) performance in the provision of public educational services?  
Recent program evaluations and case studies have made available data that allow for an 
empirical treatment of these issues.  A growing body of evaluations and studies has created a 
critical mass of information permitting a more rigorous exploration into which institutional and 
economic factors may affect the quality and provision of education services to Peruvian children 
(Instituto Apoyo 1999a, 1999b and 2000).   In particular, this study uses data taken from a recent 
evaluation of the MECEP Program (Instituto Apoyo, 1999b) and from a national household 
survey (ENAHO, 1999) in which there is a large sub-sample of teachers.   
This paper is divided into the following five sections: Section 1 describes the institutional 
context in which teacher unionization has taken place in Peru in the last three decades; Section 2 
analyzes questions about the evolution of unionization, union profiles and differential access to 
educational infrastructure; Sector 3 develops a model which will be used to answer the fourth 
question on performance based upon a production function approach; Section 4 describes the 
estimation results for the model; and Section 5 concludes.   
 
1.  Unionization and the Peruvian Educational System 
 
In contrast with the U.S. and other Latin American countries (Hoxby, 1996), the public education 
system in Peru is fairly centralized, and most if not all allocation decisions are made by a central 
authority, the Ministry of Education (MOE).  Likewise, the teachers’ union, Sindicato Unico de 
Trabajadores de la Educacion del Perú (SUTEP) is a consolidated and centralized body that 
seeks to influence both general policies as well as sector decisions.  Founded in 1973 through a 
merger of four autonomous unions, SUTEP has since been the sole teacher’s union in Peru, with 
a current membership of about 145,000 of the country’s 265,000 public teachers. 
Most analysts of the union agree that the union’s influence on policy and salary 
bargaining reached its peak in the mid 1970s, and in 1975-1977 the union organized one of the 
longest strikes against the military government.  After 1977 about 10,000 teachers (especially 
those involved in union leadership) were laid off by the military government, seriously 
weakening the union’s power.  In those years the leftist party Patria Roja gained control over the 
union leadership, which it still holds today.  
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During the 1980s SUTEP concentrated its activities on organizing eventual national 
strikes which were less and less effective as the country’s economic conditions deteriorated.  In 
1984 the union was finally recognized by the Belaúnde Government (1980-1985) after several 
years of union pressure and mobilization.   
In interviews with people related to the union, it was mentioned that unionization in the 
early years of SUTEP (1970s and early 1980s) was basically related to the political convictions 
of university students.  In those years, young students in the education career were easily 
attracted to the leftist ideology of Patria Roja, and after graduation they became union members 
as an expected next step.  Another proposition that called for attention was that the presence of 
SUTEP in rural areas was important due to the political work done by the main party behind the 
leadership.  As representation in the union leadership is related to the number of political districts 
rather than to the number of students in schools (higher in urban sites), rural areas remain 
important for party advocates and union work. 
Each year SUTEP approves a document called the “Pliego de Reclamos” in which it lists 
all its demands to the Government in terms labor conditions, wage increases and educational 
goals, among other general political issues.  The document has been losing importance over the 
years, but it is still one of the main tools that SUTEP leaders use in their union activities. 
Another very important tool of union operation is the DERRAMA fund, a fund that is 
managed by the SUTEP Executive Committee and used to provide some services (including 
loans) to union members.  The fund started with teacher salaries confiscated during the 1977 
strike, and it is also maintained by monthly contributions from members. An important change to 
the institutional context of the Peruvian educational system was the approval, in 1990 at the end 
of the Alan García government, of a new law for teachers (Ley del Profesorado) that created a 
special status for teachers.  After that law, it was stated that only those persons who have studied 
to be a teacher can be hired in the public sector, closing this option for other professionals.  Also, 
according to this law, teachers in the public sector are public servants with full duties and 
privileges.  A teacher who is tenured (i.e., which occupies a formal position in the public cadre 
of personnel, or CAP) has job security and social security benefits when retiring.  The approval 
of the Law is considered one of the SUTEP’s most important achievements.  
Since the impact of any salary adjustment for teachers on the public budget is generally 
very big, the last three governments (1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-2000) have been totally opposed to 
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any significant increase in teachers’ wages in real terms.  After the severe economic crisis of 
1990 (in which inflation reached four digits), the new Fujimori Government froze the size of the 
educational CAP in order to avoid increasing pressure on the budget from the almost 40,000 
retired teachers.  However, the demand for teachers remained high in a country in which most of 
the population sends their children to public schools.  Thus, after 1993, the authorities introduced 
an innovation in its labor relations, allowing the hiring of  “temporary” teachers.  Currently, it is 
estimated that about 25 percent of teachers have non-tenured status in the public sector.1  This 
dual structure for teachers is not linked to any significant wage differences (differentials are 
minimal; wages being equally low for all teachers).  There is, however, an important distinction: 
non-tenured teachers do not enjoy job security and as a consequence can be fired at any moment 
without compensation. In addition, they do not receive any pension benefits, as they are hired 
under a contract in which the non-tenured teacher is a sort of service provider without any of the 
considerations of a stable labor relationship.  Clearly this option was used to avoid increasing 
pressure for social benefits among teachers while accommodating the demand for an increasing 
number of teachers. 
In the 1990s the SUTEP did not play a direct role regarding wage bargaining or even 
policy decisions.  After the collapse of wages at the beginning of the 1990s, teachers’ real wages 
did not recover during the whole decade under Fujimori’s rule, and at the end of the decade they 
were a mere 70 percent of real wages in 1990 (Figure 1).  
 
                                                          
1 The Toledo administration has recently begun to grant tenure to temporary teachers based on an 
evaluation, a process which is still contested by SUTEP.  The end-point of this process (probably 2003) 
may change in unexpected ways the specific weight of the union in the educational sector, however, as 
tenured teachers are more likely to enroll in the union.   
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With teachers’ salaries at low levels, the Fujimori Government increased public 
investment in education.  Since 1996 the Peruvian educational system enjoyed higher levels of 
investment, especially in inputs, training and infrastructure.2 Although SUTEP did not play a 
significant role in these decisions, at least at the central level, it may have influenced the impacts 
on educational outputs.  Because of the massive coverage and network structure of the union, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out that SUTEP plays a significant role in the efficiency of resource 
allocation; this topic will be explored in Sections 3 and 4.  
Another important avenue through which the union may influence the educational output 
is in the process of teacher allocation itself, for example among rural and urban areas, or among 
different types of schools.  In general, according to experts interviewed for this paper, the 
process of allocation is not linked to performance or training, and teachers are assigned to rural 
and urban areas without major planning, evaluation and incentives by the MOE.  In recent years, 
temporary teachers have been much more likely to be assigned to less favorably located schools 
in rural areas. It is plausible that SUTEP may have ways to influence this allocation process 
favoring unionized teachers (to better schools), and therefore affecting the final output of the 
                                                          
2 This occurred basically through the MECEP program and the investment by FONCODES and INFES in school 
infrastructure.  
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education process.  This result would be policy relevant if unionized teachers are really different 
in the provision of educational services, which will be evaluated in Sections 3 and 4.  
 
2.  Unionization, Teacher Profile and Access to Educational Infrastructure 
 
2.1.  Unionization in the Public Teacher Career 
 
This papers uses two sources of data regarding the unionization status of teachers: (i) the 1999 
ENAHO survey, which is a representative sample of all Peruvian households in which there is a 
sub-sample of 574 teachers; and (ii) the 2000 MECEP evaluation survey, which is based on a 
stratified sample of 700 schools nationwide, with about 1,400 teachers surveyed.   
Table 1 relates teachers’ experience to current unionization status in the 1999 ENAHO 
survey.  The rate of unionization among surveyed teachers is 45 percent, and teachers with more 
experience are more likely to be unionized.  The data are also compatible with a declining rate of 
unionization in the last three decades. For the purpose of relating these figures to rates of 
unionization, however, it is necessary to accept the assumption that exit rates and changes in 
union status among teachers do not have a significant impact on the average rate of unionization.    
 
      Table 1. Experience and Unionization 
 
Nº Teachers
Year became teacher
less 1980 40 28 70%
1980-85 103 61 59%
1986-90 171 99 58%
1991-99 260 72 28%
Total 574 260 45%
Source: ENAHO 1999
Unionized
 
 
If it is accepted that the rate of unionization in the public educational system has been 
dropping in the last three decades, the data suggest that this phenomenon has been more dramatic 
in the 1990s, associated basically with the entry of non-tenured teachers who are less likely to be 
unionized.   
It should be mentioned that the ENAHO sample is not necessarily representative of 
teachers. Nonetheless, given the importance of teachers in the total number of households (about 
12 percent of households include a teacher), it may be a good approximation. 
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Figure 2 shows the total number of teachers in the ENAHO sample by four categories in 
terms of unionization and labor contract.  The horizontal axis displays the year in which teachers 
in the sample started teaching. 
 
Figure 2. Teachers Classified by Unionization and Type of Contract  
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     Source: ENAHO 1999. 
 
The figure supports the idea that lower unionization in the 1990s could be associated with 
the increasing importance of non-tenured teachers in that decade, especially after 1995.  If 
temporarily hired teachers are excluded from the sample, the proportion of unionization is 57 
percent instead of 45 percent. Thus, the average rate of SUTEP affiliation may be about 60 
percent among tenured teachers.   
As shown in Figure 2 below, the sample of teachers from the MECEP evaluation shows 
the same pattern observed in Table 1.  Affiliation with the union has been much more common in 
teachers with more than 10 years of experience compared to teachers who have recently entered 
the profession.  The presence of temporarily hired teachers in recent years is clearly one of the 
reasons for this difference.  
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Figure 3. 
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    Source: MECEP evaluation survey, MOE and Instituto APOYO. 
 
2.2. Teacher Profile and Union Status 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of teachers taken from the ENAHO sample of teachers at the 
national level by type of location. 
 
Table 2. Unionization of Teachers and Location 
 
Non Unionized Rate of
Unionized Union
Capital cities 81 52 39%
Big cities 58 68 54%
With more than 2,000 inh. 88 57 39%
Total urban 227 177 44%
500-2000 inhabitants 35 43 55%
Disperse 52 40 43%
Total rural 87 83 49%
Total 314 260 45%  
                   Source: ENAHO 1999. 
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As can be seen, unionization is greater in rural areas (49 percent) than in urban areas (44 
percent), a difference that is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  This 
result is consistent with interviews with SUTEP members, who state that the union has a strong 
presence in rural areas. 
Table 3 displays a similar breakdown for teachers’ tenure status. 
 
Table 3. Tenure Status of Teachers and Location   
 
Non Tenured Rate of
Tenured Tenure
Capital cities 26 107 80%
Big cities 36 90 71%
With more than 2,000 inh. 46 99 68%
Total urban 108 296 73%
500-2000 inhabitants 22 56 72%
Disperse 33 59 64%
Total rural 55 115 68%
Total 163 411 72%  
 Source: ENAHO 1999. 
 
As can be seen, non-tenured teachers are more likely to be assigned to rural areas than 
tenured teachers, which reflects the increasing presence of temporary teachers in rural areas. This 
factor may negatively affect the rate of unionization in rural areas (as temporary teachers are less 
likely to join), although it still did not have the effect of making unionization less strong in rural 
than in urban areas.  In general, as mentioned before, temporary teachers are currently being 
allocated to the poorest schools, which are generally located in rural areas without major 
incentives.  
Table 4 presents the proportion of teachers who have a secondary activity besides 
teaching, ordered by location. It can be seen that unionized teachers are more likely to have a 
secondary activity, but this may be the case because teachers with secondary activities join the 
union in order to have some extra protection from being fired.  Unionized and tenured teachers 
 13
have a slightly higher presence of secondary activities than non-unionized, but the difference is 
not significant in statistical terms.   
 
Table 4. Secondary Activity by Teachers 
Non-Tenure Tenure Total Non-Tenure Tenure Total
Have secondary activity(%)
Capital cities 38% 40% 40% 80% 40% 44%
Big cities 35% 52% 43% 80% 33% 37%
With more than 2,000 inh. 41% 39% 40% 57% 58% 58%
Rural 500-2000 inhabitants 53% 39% 46% 60% 55% 56%
Rural disperse 52% 65% 58% 25% 61% 57%
Total 43% 45% 44% 62% 48% 49%
Non-Unionized Unionized
  Source: ENAHO 1999. 
 
Looking at other characteristics of teachers and their union status in the ENAHO sample 
of teachers, a probit estimation was made of the probability of being unionized in relation to 
several other characteristics.  The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Factors Affecting Unionization Rates 
                   Probit estimates for Unionization of Teachers
Number of obs 574
LR chi2(6) 111
Pseudo R2 0.141
Log likelihood = -339.7
dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ]
Rural 0.079 0.049 1.62 0.10 0.30 -0.02 0.18
Tenure 0.323 0.054 5.21 0.00 0.72 0.22 0.43
Single -0.086 0.056 -1.52 0.13 0.24 -0.19 0.02
Male 0.125 0.044 2.81 0.01 0.48 0.04 0.21
Age -0.005 0.004 -1.06 0.29 34.93 -0.01 0.00
Experience (years) 0.015 0.006 2.73 0.01 9.05 0.00 0.03
obs. P    .4529617
pred. P    .4356322 (at x-bar)  
 
Both rural location (although at a 10 percent level of significance) and tenure status (a 
tenured teacher is 32 percent more likely to be unionized than a non-tenured teacher) are clearly 
related to union status, confirming the statistical validity of the previous analysis of differences.  
In terms of the other features in the regression, it is seen that years of experience as a teacher is 
an important variable associated with unionization.  Even when tenured status and location are 
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controlled for, the experience variable appears significant implying than unionization is more 
likely among teachers with more experience.  Another important result is that male teachers are 
much more likely (13 percent) to be unionized than female teachers.  Marital status and age 
appear as non-significant at the 10 percent level of significance. 
The data from the MECEP evaluation survey provides similar results in terms of the 
variables analyzed with the ENAHO survey.  However, the MECEP data provide somewhat 
more information about teachers.  For instance, Table 6 presents the level of education and the 
institution from which teachers graduated.  It can be seen that hired (i.e., non-tenured) teachers 
are more likely to come from an institute than from a university.  They are also more likely to 
come from a private institute in comparison with tenured teachers.   
 
Table 6. Teachers’ Levels of Education  
 
Hired Tenure Total Hired Tenure Total
Level of Education
Only secondary 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Institute 88 291 379 12 238 250 629
University 18 93 111 3 80 83 194
Other 2 35 37 1 18 19 56
Institution  
Public Institute 71 301 372 11 237 248 620
Private Institute 15 15 30 1 10 11 41
Public University 16 78 94 1 72 73 167
Private University 2 12 14 1 11 12 26
Other 4 13 17 2 5 7 24
 
Total 108 419 527 16 335 351 878
Hired Tenure Total Hired Tenure Total
Level of Education
Only secondary 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1%
Institute 81.5% 69.5% 71.9% 75.0% 71.0% 71.2% 71.6%
University 16.7% 22.2% 21.1% 18.8% 23.9% 23.6% 22.1%
Other 1.9% 8.4% 7.0% 6.3% 5.4% 5.4% 6.4%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Institution
Public Institute 65.7% 71.8% 70.6% 68.8% 70.7% 70.7% 70.6%
Private Institute 13.9% 3.6% 5.7% 6.3% 3.0% 3.1% 4.7%
Public University 14.8% 18.6% 17.8% 6.3% 21.5% 20.8% 19.0%
Private University 1.9% 2.9% 2.7% 6.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.0%
Other 3.7% 3.1% 3.2% 12.5% 1.5% 2.0% 2.7%
TOTAL
Percentages by column
No Sutep Sutep TOTAL
No Sutep Sutep
 
Source: MECEP Evaluation Survey, MOE, Instituto APOYO 
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This sample shows that 9 percent of teachers are not degreed, a proportion which is 
greater among unionized teachers (10 percent versus 6 percent among the non-unionized).  In the 
non-unionized group, non-degreed teachers are found exclusively among temporarily hired 
teachers, whereas in the unionized group the non-degreed percentage is the same for hired and 
tenured teachers.   
 
2.3. Access to Educational Resources 
 
Teachers may have differentiated access to educational resources according to different 
characteristics and the decisions made by the MOE.  This sub-section therefore analyzes the 
access of teachers to some educational resources using data from the MECEP evaluation study. 
Table 7 presents data related to educational infrastructure by teachers according to their 
tenure and unionization status.  As can be seen, tenured teachers are more likely to be located at 
bigger and better schools (polidocentes) than non-tenured teachers.  In other words, non-tenured 
teachers are more likely to be present in unidocente (i.e., rural) schools. 
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Table 7. Infrastructure and Teachers’ Union and Tenure 
Status
Non-Tenure Tenure Non-Tenure Tenure
Teachers 188 419 46 454 1107
School features
Polidocente 22% 57% 17% 62% 52%
Multigrado 37% 43% 20% 36% 38%
Unidocente 42% 0% 63% 2% 11%
Drinkable water 52% 73% 50% 78% 71%
Electricity 23% 54% 22% 61% 50%
Sewarage 17% 44% 11% 53% 42%
Director in Sutep 20% 28% 93% 43% 36%
Local features
Drinkable water 58% 73% 59% 81% 73%
Electricity 28% 56% 26% 64% 54%
Sewarage 16% 42% 9% 52% 40%
Health center 33% 66% 33% 69% 60%
Hospital 4% 18% 2% 20% 16%
Telephone 18% 45% 11% 54% 42%
Paved road 29% 48% 20% 64% 50%
Bank 3% 17% 2% 25% 17%
Police station 10% 29% 11% 38% 29%
Secondary school 18% 49% 17% 60% 47%
Spanish 61% 79% 76% 84% 78%
Non-Union Union Total
 
Source: MECEP Evaluation, MOE, Instituto APOYO. 
 
This pattern clearly affects access to educational and local infrastructure.  Polidocente 
schools are more likely to have electricity and drinkable water.  Also, in terms of the context in 
which the school is located, it is apparent that polidocente schools are more common in urban 
areas and so, have better local services.  This analysis suggests that in comparing access to 
educational resources by unionized or non-unionized teachers it is necessary to control for type 
of school   
The table shows that when the surveyed teacher is affiliated with SUTEP the principal of 
the school is also more likely to be a member of the union.  This seems to be related to the fact 
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that in multigrado and unidocente schools the interviewed teacher is generally the principal of 
the school as well. 
In order to make the analysis easier and to incorporate other variables associated with 
teachers, an index of access to educational infrastructure was constructed in which school 
features have a weight of 75 percent and local services 25 percent.3  This index gives a good idea 
of differences in school quality, i.e., in teachers’ access to educational infrastructure. 
Two regressions were run, one for polidocente schools and the other for multigrado 
schools, in order to see whether there are some differences in teachers’ access to educational 
resources controlling by type of school (problems were encountered with teachers’ data for 
unidocente schools).  The results are presented in Table 8.   
 
                                                          
3 The index was built as follows. There were 17 items of access to infrastructure, 11 for local services and 6 for 
school services, so there are two vectors with 11 and 6 components, respectively.  The ratio of existent services was 
taken in each vector (a value between 0 and 1).  Local services were weighted by 0.25, and school services by 0.75, 
thus obtaining the total index for infrastructure.   
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Table 8.  Effects of Unionization on Access to Infrastructure 
           Regression of Infrastructure index on teacher features
Polidocente schools
Number of obs 482.0
F(  5,   476) 53.2
Prob > F 0.00
R-squared 0.36
Adj R-squared 0.35
Root MSE 0.19
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Union 0.011 0.018 0.603 0.547 -0.025 0.046
Tenured 0.049 0.031 1.583 0.114 -0.012 0.109
Number classrooms 0.022 0.001 15.289 0.000 0.019 0.024
Male -0.038 0.018 -2.043 0.042 -0.074 -0.001
Age (years) 0.022 0.012 1.734 0.084 -0.003 0.046
Constant 0.200 0.039 5.182 0.000 0.124 0.276
           Regression of Infrastructure index on teacher features
Multigrado schools
Number of obs 382
F(  5,   376) 8.28
Prob > F 0.00
R-squared 0.10
Adj R-squared 0.09
Root MSE 0.21
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Union 0.049 0.023 2.135 0.033 0.004 0.094
Tenured 0.001 0.028 0.052 0.959 -0.053 0.056
Number classrooms 0.043 0.007 5.913 0.000 0.029 0.058
Male -0.001 0.001 -0.537 0.592 -0.004 0.002
Age (years) -0.001 0.001 -1.001 0.317 -0.003 0.001
Constant 0.084 0.035 2.377 0.018 0.015 0.154  
 
 
As can be seen, in the case of polidocente schools union and tenure status do not seem to 
play a role in differential access.  However, all other variables are significant at 10 percent, 
implying that female and older teachers have better access.  Also, as expected, the number of 
classrooms (school size) is clearly associated with the quality of infrastructure.  
In the case of multigrado schools, which are smaller than polidocentes and much more 
likely to be in rural areas (in the MECEP evaluation defined rural-urban location was not 
available), union status seems to play a role in improving access to infrastructure.  This is also 
true for the number of classrooms or school size (in this case the variation is only within the 
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multigrado schools).  Tenure, age and gender do not have statistically significant coefficients in 
the regression. 
These regression assume causality from unionization to access, an assumption that can be 
challenged as teachers with better access may have more incentives to become unionized.  The 
use of panel data (with teachers changing union status through time) or finding a good 
instrumental variable linked to unionization but not to access may help to solve this problem, but 
these types of data were not available.  In this case the only conclusion that can be derived is that 
there is a positive correlation between unionization and access to infrastructure, but only for 
multigrado schools, which are smaller and more rural. This relationship, however, requires 
further investigation using more appropriate data. 
This section has found empirical evidence about potential factors affecting unionization 
of teachers and correlations between union status and access to educational infrastructure.  This 
section did not, however, address how unionization may affect the quality of the education 
service provided by the state. The next section develops a model to assess this issue, and this 
model is used to test hypotheses regarding the impact of unionization on educational services. 
 
3. A Production Function Model for Assessing the Impact of Unionization on 
the Provision of Education 
 
3.1. The Production Function Model 
 
In order to consider the potential impact of unionization on the quality of educational services, a 
production function approach like that of Hoxby (1996) will be used to analyze the impact of 
teacher unionization on educational services in the United States.  The “classroom” will be used 
as the unit of analysis for the specification.  Furthermore, each classroom is mainly associated 
with one teacher, as the focus is on primary education. 
A generic production function for educational services in a given classroom is defined as: 
 ( hrefy ;,= )    (1) 
 
where f(.) is a well defined function; “y” is a measure of student achievement; “e” represents the 
effort level supplied by the classroom’s teacher in educational processes; “r” are physical inputs 
used by the teacher and students (books, pedagogical materials, etc.) “h” is a vector representing 
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other geographic, school, teacher, and student characteristics.  As usual, it is assumed that f’e>0, 
f’’e<0; f’r>0; f’’r<0; f’er>0; so “e” and “r” are inputs with decreasing returns given any fixed 
input and are complementary in the production of educational services. 
Departing from Hoxby’s model for the United States (where teachers have influence on 
budget decisions and input allocation), a model is here specified in which the only variable that 
teachers control is effort level: 
 
     (2)   ( vtuwge ,,;= )
                                                          
 
where w is the implicit cost or disutility of effort for the teacher, u is union status, t is tenure 
status, and v are specific teacher characteristics.   
Equations (1) and (2) have the form of a production function in which effort enters as an 
input in the production equation, and it depends on prices and institutional variables.  As 
generally effort cannot be directly measured, most studies estimate a reduced form, plugging (2) 
into (1).   
In the present case, however, alternative direct measures of effort will be used in the 
estimation of equation (1).  The output measure is taken from math and language tests applied to 
a sample of students in the MECEP evaluation. 
 
3.2  Looking for a Direct Measure of Effort 
 
The MECEP evaluation4 includes in-class observation data, from which three variables have 
been taken to approximate teachers’ effort: (i) use of time in class, (ii) good control of the 
classroom and (iii) students’ opinions about the teacher.  Students’ opinions on their teachers’ 
ability and behavior are drawn from the student survey.  The mean of these variables for 
unionized and non-unionized teachers are shown in Table 9.5 
4 See Annex 1 for a brief description of the MECEP evaluation dataset. 
5 There were no non-tenured teachers in the sub-sample of 90 classes used for in-class observation, so the tenure 
variable cannot be used in the analysis. 
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Table 9. Teacher Behavior in Class 
 
 Non-Union Union Total
Use of time in class (minutes) 
Time required 261 266 263** 
Time observed 213 203 208** 
Lecturing 38 29 33** 
Dialog 27 34 31** 
Students reading 16 25 21** 
Students writing 66 69 68*
Individual work 52 50 51
Group work 47 54 51** 
No atention 23 21 22** 
Good control of class 
Good Knowledge (1 to 4) 3.12 3.20 3.16**
Clarity (1 to 4) 3.06 3.18 3.12**
Conduct control (1 to 4) 2.80 3.11 2.96**
Students opinion about the teacher
Answers my questions 90% 90% 90%
Is concerned about my learning 91% 87% 89%**
He/she hits me when I misbehave 51% 40% 45%**
Does not show up to class often 15% 15% 15%
Is late often 21% 18% 19%*
Is good explaining 91% 93% 92%*
Asks for questions in class 86% 85% 86%
Asks us to use books from library 77% 76% 76%  
  Source: In-class observation and student survey, MECEP Evaluation, sample size: 90 classrooms.   
** Means are different at 95 percent; * Means are different at 90 percent. 
 
The means among the two groups (unionized and non-unionized) are statistically 
different for most variables.  However, there are some variables in which differences are not 
significant, mostly in students’ opinions about their teachers.  
In terms of the use of time, the duration of daily sessions seems to be smaller for 
unionized teachers, who have a total of 203 minutes per day versus 213 minutes per day for non-
unionized teachers.  On average, the sessions amount to 79 percent of the total required time, but 
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unionized teachers accomplish only 77 percent of the required time versus 82 percent for non-
unionized.  This may imply that unionized teachers devote less time to teaching. 
Despite the absolute time devoted to daily sessions, it is important to consider the use of 
that time.  According to what trained observers report, teachers use about one hour daily for 
teacher activity as such (lecturing and talking with students).  The use of that time is different by 
unionization status: unionized teachers spend less time lecturing and more time talking with 
students than non-unionized teachers.  It is not clear whether these differences may be important 
in terms of the quality of teaching, although it seems that unionized teachers seem to involve 
students more in class activity.   
In terms of the second variable, good class control, the observers rate teachers’ behavior 
on a scale from 1 to 4 in terms of knowledge of the matter taught; clarity of explanations and 
conduct control in class.  In all areas items unionized teachers demonstrated better class 
management. 
Students do not express major differences in their opinions of unionized and non-
unionized teachers, with the notable exception of teachers’ tendency to hit students in class.  
Among children surveyed, 45 percent stated that teachers sometimes hit them in class, a 
percentage that is greater for non-unionized teachers (51 percent compared to 40 percent).  This 
is consistent with observers’ reports of better class control by unionized teachers.  In all other 
areas, students do not perceive significant differences. 
This information suggests that the variables associated with class management are a 
possible measure of teacher effort in class.  The use of this variable as a proxy for effort has two 
limitations: (i) it is possible that some specific factors related to the children in the classrooms, 
i.e., a small number of disruptive children, may affect and distort the measure, as in this case a 
lower control may in fact reflect a higher effort by the teacher; (ii) the observation of how 
teachers work in class by informed observers can in some way alter teacher behavior.  Even 
considering these two limitations, this variable appears to be the best alternative available from 
the MECEP evaluation.  The observation distortion, also, should not affect the variation between 
unionized and non-unionized teachers, which is the variation needed for this estimation.  In the 
empirical analysis that follows the sum of the three class control variables will be used as a 
proxy for teacher effort in class. 
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4.  Production Function Analysis 
 
The dataset used for the estimation consists of 90 classrooms in which math and language test 
scores were applied to students and in which teacher practices and their use of inputs were 
observed during three days by specialized observers.  This dataset has most of the variables used 
in equation (1) from the model. 
This dataset, however, has some limitations given its relatively small size.  Moreover, in 
only 65 classrooms did evaluators ask about unionization.  Within this sample, 15 teachers did 
not respond to this question, which leaves a total of only 50 classrooms for analysis with the 
union variable.  
An additional feature of the data was that all the teachers in the 90 classrooms sampled 
were tenured.  This is not a bad thing for the estimation, as it prevents confusing union and 
tenure status effects.  Using a dataset in which all teachers are tenured makes it possible to check 
for pure union impacts.  Another important feature of this dataset is that it did not include 
unidocente (mostly rural) schools, so that dimension is excluded from the analysis. 
Still, as complete information is available for about the 90 classrooms and teachers when 
the union variable is not considered, the estimation process will begin by abstracting for a 
moment from the union variable.  The union question will be introduced after estimating the 
production function for the whole 90-classroom dataset.  
 
4.1. The Production Function without Union Status 
 
Based on equation (1) of the model the following equation is estimated: 
 
uerTCNY ++++++= 54321 βββββα   (3) 
 
where Y is the log of average student achievement or result (standardized test scores) for the 
classroom, N and C are vectors of student and community characteristics, T represents teacher 
characteristics (gender, experience) r is input use by teacher (textbooks), and e is effort in 
teaching measured as the sum of the three class control variables of class control described in 
Section 4.   
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Because the sampling scheme used for the MECEP evaluation implies that what are 
selected are classrooms, the standard errors of the estimation are corrected for by using the 
software package Stata© Version 5.0 with an option for sample design in running regressions 
(the routine is called svyreg).  This provides estimations with standard errors which consider the 
fact that students are clustered in the 90 classrooms.  The regression results are presented in 
Table 10. 
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Table 10. 
Production Function Regression
Math test
Number of obs 2270
Number of strata 1
Number of PSUs 88
Population size 2270
F(   8,     80) 10.58
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.1636
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Effort 0.0772 0.0439 1.7590 0.0820 -0.0100 0.1644
Use of text 0.0344 0.0190 1.8080 0.0740 -0.0034 0.0722
Urban area 0.0394 0.0296 1.3320 0.1860 -0.0194 0.0981
Student works -0.0522 0.0118 -4.4250 0.0000 -0.0757 -0.0288
School index 0.1967 0.0621 3.1690 0.0020 0.0733 0.3200
Sixth grade 0.0022 0.0201 0.1070 0.9150 -0.0378 0.0422
Experience -0.0096 0.0103 -0.9340 0.3530 -0.0300 0.0108
Teacher male -0.0517 0.0256 -2.0200 0.0460 -0.1026 -0.0008
Constant 5.4073 0.1007 53.6820 0.0000 5.2071 5.6075
Language Test
Number of obs 2309
Number of strata 1
Number of PSUs 88
Population size 2309
F(   8,     80) 17.09
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.186
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Effort 0.0901 0.0391 2.3020 0.0240 0.0123 0.1678
Use of text -0.0653 0.0303 -2.1540 0.0340 -0.1256 -0.0050
Urban 0.0973 0.0291 3.3400 0.0010 0.0394 0.1552
Student works -0.0456 0.0165 -2.7550 0.0070 -0.0785 -0.0127
School index 0.1360 0.0484 2.8100 0.0060 0.0398 0.2323
Sixth grade 0.0117 0.0197 0.5940 0.5540 -0.0275 0.0509
Experience 0.0000 0.0111 -0.0020 0.9980 -0.0220 0.0220
Teacher male -0.0488 0.0225 -2.1650 0.0330 -0.0936 -0.0040
Constant 5.3629 0.0874 61.353 0.0000 5.1892 5.5366  
 26
As can be seen, most variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign.  In 
particular, teachers’ effort, measured as the sum of the three class control variables, has a 
positive coefficient at the 8.2 percent significance level for the math test, and at the 2.4 percent 
significance level for the language test, implying that what teachers do in class has a clear impact 
on student achievement.  Textbook use appears to be positive for student achievement in math, 
but negative for the language test; according to these estimations, it therefore seems that the math 
textbook is having a better impact on students than the language textbooks. 
Among other variables, the fact that a student works has a negative impact on student 
achievement, both in math and language, whereas the index of school quality favors student 
achievement in both cases.  Teacher experience appears with a coefficient not significantly 
different from zero, whereas male teachers tend to have a lower performance in math and 
language tests. 
 
4.2. Production Function with Union Analysis 
 
First estimated is a regression of effort on union status and other teacher and school 
characteristics, corrected for clustering.  Table 11 presents the results, indicating that union status 
does not play a role in the effort supplied by teachers.  School quality and experience appear as 
variables with a positive impact on effort. 
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Table 11. 
Regression of Unionization on Effort
Number of obs 1329
Number of strata 1
Number of PSUs 50
Population size 1329
F(   5,     45) 2.18
Prob > F 0.0734
R-squared 0.1697
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Union 0.0428 0.0461 0.9280 0.3580 -0.0499 0.1354
Urban -0.0389 0.0596 -0.6530 0.5170 -0.1587 0.0809
School index 0.2661 0.1394 1.9090 0.0620 -0.0141 0.5462
Experience 0.0725 0.0352 2.0630 0.0440 0.0019 0.1432
Male 0.0272 0.0470 0.5780 0.5660 -0.0673 0.1216
Constant 1.8673 0.1124 16.6170 0.0000 1.6414 2.0931  
 
For testing the direct role of unionization on student achievement, a regression was run 
on test scores, including union as an independent variable but excluding effort.  As can be seen 
in Table 12, for both math and language, the unionization coefficient does not appear statistically 
different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. In the case of math scores, the coefficient 
is positive and significant at 13.2 percent, whereas for language scores the coefficient is 
negative.  The other coefficients display similar behavior to that found in the larger dataset of 90 
classrooms, suggesting that the production function specification was not altered by the smaller 
sample taken (of 50 classrooms). 
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Table 12. 
Production Function Regression w ith U nion V ariable
M ath test
N um ber of obs 1283
N um ber of strata 1
N um ber of PSU s 50
Population size 1283
F(   8,     42) 5.53
Prob > F 0.0001
R -squared 0.1487
C oef. Std. Err. t P>t [95%  C onf. Interval]
U nion 0.0352 0.0230 1.5330 0.1320 -0.0109 0.0814
U se of text 0.0488 0.0240 2.0340 0.0470 0.0006 0.0970
U rban 0.0266 0.0485 0.5480 0.5860 -0.0709 0.1241
Student w orks -0.0458 0.0169 -2.7130 0.0090 -0.0798 -0.0119
School index 0.1778 0.0907 1.9600 0.0560 -0.0045 0.3601
Sixth grade 0.0188 0.0298 0.6310 0.5310 -0.0411 0.0787
Experience 0.0024 0.0141 0.1700 0.8660 -0.0259 0.0307
Teacher m ale -0.0728 0.0338 -2.1530 0.0360 -0.1407 -0.0049
C onstant 5.5539 0.0588 94.4060 0.0000 5.4356 5.6721
Language Test
N um ber of obs 1292
N um ber of strata 1
N um ber of PSU s 50
Population size 1292
F(   8,     42) 6.6
Prob > F 0
R -squared 0.1714
C oef. Std. Err. t P>t [95%  C onf. Interval]
U nion -0.0026 0.0306 -0.0860 0.9320 -0.0641 0.0589
U se of text -0.0959 0.0418 -2.2930 0.0260 -0.1799 -0.0118
U rban 0.0819 0.0521 1.5710 0.1230 -0.0229 0.1867
Student w orks -0.0305 0.0236 -1.2890 0.2030 -0.0780 0.0170
School index 0.2167 0.0750 2.8880 0.0060 0.0659 0.3674
Sixth grade 0.0306 0.0312 0.9820 0.3310 -0.0321 0.0934
Experience 0.0176 0.0165 1.0610 0.2940 -0.0157 0.0508
Teacher m ale -0.0724 0.0315 -2.3000 0.0260 -0.1356 -0.0091
C onstant 5.4752 0.0717 76.3560 0.0000 5.3311 5.6193  
 29
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has combined two sources of quantitative information in order to answer questions 
regarding the extent, profile and role of teachers’ unionization on the quality of public education 
in Peru.   
An analysis of the cross-section data taken from ENAHO 1999 and the MECEP 
evaluation study finds evidence compatible with the hypothesis that unionization has been 
declining in the last three decades, especially during the 1990s due to the hiring of temporary 
teachers.  From rates of 70 percent to 80 percent for teachers who started working in the 1970s, 
the rate of unionization currently is less than half the teacher population.  It is not clear if this 
trend will continue in the near future, as the current government has begun a process of 
eliminating temporary teaching positions from public education. 
In general, unionized teachers tend to be older and more experienced, and are more likely 
to be male.  Most unionized teachers are tenured, although there is a small set of non-tenured 
teachers who are members of the union.  The presence of the union in rural areas is still 
important, and is related to the electoral mechanisms for union representation. 
In term of access to educational infrastructure, the MECEP evaluation data indicates that 
unionized teachers do not enjoy access to better infrastructure at the polidocente schools, but that 
they have better access at the multigrado schools (which are an intermediate between 
polidocente and unidocente or rural schools).  This may imply that unionized teachers are more 
successful in improving their position at this intermediate level, but with no ability to do so for 
larger schools. 
This paper has identified variables directly linked to teacher effort, facilitating the 
estimation of a reduced form of the traditional production function like Hoxby’s.  The estimation 
of the production function for a sample of 90 classrooms without a union indicates that the effort 
variable works well and that, despite the dataset’s small size, the expected signs are found for 
most of the independent variables.  Using the smaller dataset with the union variable, the 
analysis indicates that unionization does not play a role either in the supply of effort by teachers 
or in math and language test scores.  Thus, in the Peruvian case, this preliminary evidence 
suggest that unionization may not affect the provision of public education in a definite way. 
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Annex 1. Description of the MECEP Evaluation Database 
 
At the end of 1995 the Ministry of Education (MOE), Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) and World Bank (IBRD) jointly designed and created a nationwide program (known by 
its Spanish acronym MECEP) to improve the quality of primary education. The program was 
designed to achieve improvements in the quality of education through the introduction of new 
teaching practices, modernization of the administrative process, and the rehabilitation of existing 
infrastructure. 
A team at Instituto Apoyo made a comprehensive evaluation (Instituto Apoyo, 1999 b) of 
the impact of MECEP throughout Peru.  A by-product of the evaluation is a large database, 
described below, which will allow exploration of the determinants of the quality of education at 
the primary level and how these relationships are affected by teachers’ union status. 
The first part of Instituto Apoyo’s MECEP database is comprised of teachers’ and 
principals’ answers to detailed questionnaires.  Of a total of 26,606 education centers throughout 
Peru, a random sample of 700 was chosen using stratification methodologies that ensure 
representative samples with respect to geography, size, and MECEP involvement.  Furthermore, 
within the 700 schools, three classrooms (one of each of second, fourth, and sixth grades) were 
randomly chosen.6  The result is a dataset of approximately 2,200 teachers and 700 school 
directors throughout Peru.  A summary of the main variables of interest follows. 
 
I Geographic Location 
a. Department 
b. Province 
c. District 
d. Locality 
II School ID 
a. Nationwide MOE school ID 
III School Characteristics 
a. Access to basic services (light, water, sewage) 
b. Government intervention through some social program 
                                                          
6 With the exception of single-classroom/single-teacher (unidocente) schools, from which only one sample was 
extracted 
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c. Type of social assistance 
d. Other groups that provide social assistance 
IV Teacher Profile 
a. Sex 
b. Age 
c. Educational Level 
d. Years of study 
e. Place of study 
f. Specialty of study 
g. Licensed/not licensed as a teacher 
h. Tenured / contracted teacher 
i. Member / non-member of teacher’s union (SUTEP) 
j. Number of years as a teacher 
k. Training under MECEP program 
l. Number of years trained 
m. Place of geographic origin 
V Characteristics of teacher’s job 
a. Number of grades taught 
b. Number of primary grades taught 
c. Years dedicated to teaching 
d. Years teaching at current school 
e. Attendance of teacher 
VI Materials & Curricula 
a. Availability of educational materials 
b. Use of educational materials 
c. Use of consolidated curriculum 
VII Teacher Training 
a. Use of methods learned during teacher training 
b. Perception regarding the new methods learned 
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Furthermore, a subset of 90 classrooms (randomly chosen from 45 of the 700 schools) 
were selected for a second phase of the evaluation.  Standardized tests that will gauge student 
aptitude in basic language and mathematics skills will be administered to 30 students in each of 
the 90 classrooms and the corresponding teachers were evaluated as to the use of new 
pedagogical techniques and practices.  A small survey of all 2,700 students obtained information 
about their socio-economic background and their opinions about their teacher. 
The evaluators conducted 3-day in situ evaluations of the teachers’ techniques, practices 
and use of educational materials.  A detailed analysis of the resources available to the class 
(blackboards, desks, books, computers, etc.) as well as an assessment of the effort and/or 
dedication of the teachers was also part of the three-day evaluations.  The information from these 
evaluations is of critical importance for this study, as evaluators attempted to gather information 
not only on input availability and practices as stated by teachers but also on input use and 
practice adoption from a more objective point of view.  Also, they were able to provide an 
assessment of teachers’ ability in class, a factor rarely available for empirical research.  It is clear 
that the information also has limitations, as the presence of the evaluator may have changed 
teacher behavior. 
 
The variables of interest from the second phase of the evaluation are presented below: 
 
I. Classroom Environment & Materials 
a. Classroom layout 
b. Availability and condition of blackboards 
c. Usage of wall space 
d. Availability and condition of desks and chairs 
e. Condition of teacher desk 
II. Educational Materials 
a. Availability and usage of books 
b. Various observations regarding the use of books in teaching 
c. Existence and usage of library 
d. Additional materials (Geometric figures, balances, lab equipment, etc) 
III. Duration of Class 
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a. Total duration 
b. Duration of lecture 
c. Duration of dialog and student interaction 
IV. Pedagogical Activities 
a. Group work 
b. Form of supervision 
V. Teacher Aptitude 
a. Logic/Mathematics 
b. Communication 
c. Language 
VI. Teacher disposition (aggression, indifference, authoritarianism, etc) 
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